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ONE-STEP FORWARD: THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
PROVIDES CLARITY TO THE 
INCREMENTAL APPROACH  
TO RULEMAKING 
CORY LEWIS* 
Abstract: In 2011, EPA issued the Deferral Rule, excusing generators of biogen-
ic b-CO2—emitted from the combustion of biological materials—from Clean Air 
Act (CAA) regulations for three years. Citing the need to study b-CO2, EPA in-
voked three legal doctrines to justify the rule: the de minimus, one-step-at-a-time, 
and administrative necessity doctrines. This Comment addresses Center for Bio-
logical Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency, where the Center for Bio-
logical Diversity challenged the Deferral Rule in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule. Although the court did not 
decide the issue of statutory authority, it dismissed EPA’s legal justifications as 
incompetently invoked. Focusing on the one-step-at-a-time doctrine, the decision 
clarifies that although incremental rulemaking might be justified, it must be in 
furtherance of congressional intent, which, in this case, was to regulate all CO2—
biogenic or otherwise—under the CAA. The D.C. Circuit’s decision is a decisive 
victory for the environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Planet Earth is getting warmer.1 During the past century, Earth’s average 
temperature has risen 1.4°F, and at the current pace, the temperature could in-
crease by as much as 11°F during the next century—the results could be cata-
strophic.2 National scientific authorities concur that climate change is happen-
ing, and that humans are contributing to it.3 The primary cause of climate 
change is the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG).4 Eighty-four percent of the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. The au-
thor would like to thank Amal Bala, Brian Reilly, Kevin Gerarde, and fellow staff writer Natalia 
Cabrera for their continued guidance and support throughout the Comment-writing process. 
 1 Climate Change: Basic Information, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/basics/ (last updated Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/Q95K-EJLM. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Climate Change: Answers to Basic Questions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/basics/facts.html#ref1 (last updated Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/L9ZD-
SF2N. 
 4 Climate Change: Causes of Climate Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/science/causes.html#greenhouseeffect (last updated Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/
KS67-YXTM. 
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GHG emitted by the United States is carbon dioxide (CO2).5 In fact, CO2 is the 
primary GHG pollutant.6 Although most CO2 emissions are a result of fossil 
fuel combustion, biological material combustion and decomposition also emits 
a significant amount of CO2, referred to by EPA as biogenic carbon dioxide (b-
CO2).7 
EPA is tasked with protecting human health and the environment.8 One of 
EPA’s current primary functions is to monitor and regulate the climate-change-
causing emissions of GHGs from American industry.9 To achieve this mission, 
EPA implements and enforces rules and regulations in response to congres-
sional laws.10 One such law, the Clean Air Act (CAA), requires EPA to regulate 
any air pollutant it determines “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”11 Following the Supreme Court decision in Massa-
chusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,12 EPA recognized CO2 as such an 
air pollutant.13 
Unlike fossil fuel emissions, b-CO2 emissions occur both naturally and 
anthropogenically.14 Although the effect of CO2 on the atmosphere occurs re-
gardless of its source, the amount of naturally emitted b-CO2—from the de-
composition of organic materials—is subsequently sequestered back out of the 
atmosphere by newly grown plants.15 On July 20, 2011, “citing its ongoing 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Carbon Pollution Standards: Learn About Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants#
what (last updated Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/ZH94-RP5P. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Climate Change: Carbon Dioxide Sources Associated with Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/biogenic-emissions.html (last 
updated Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/93BR-BDM8. 
 8 About EPA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa (last updated Sept. 20, 2013), 
available at http://perma.cc/7YLN-5AZT. 
 9 See Regulatory Initiatives, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPA
activities/regulatory-initiatives.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/72QQ-
UG3V. 
 10 About EPA: Our Mission and What We Do, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/
aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last updated June 3, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/
L7FN-PF7M. 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
 12 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007) (indicating that EPA has statutory authority under the CAA to regu-
late climate change-causing GHGs). 
 13 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) 
[hereinafter Endangerment Finding]. 
 14 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 722 F.3d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 15 See Deferral for CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Programs: Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 15,249, 
15,252 (Mar. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) [hereinafter Proposed Deferral 
Rule] (some b-CO2 emissions could be carbon-neutral as natural processes pull as much CO2 out of 
the atmosphere as they emit). This effect does not, however, occur for anthropogenic sources of b-CO2 
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efforts to understand the unique characteristics of [b-CO2],”16 EPA issued the 
Deferral Rule, which exempted b-CO2 sources from regulation at Step 2 of the 
Tailoring Rule for a three-year period.17 
On April 7, 2011, the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) and several 
other environmental groups filed a petition to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit challenging the Deferral Rule.18 CBD argued that EPA had pre-
sented no legitimate or sufficient legal justification that granted it the authority 
to pass the rule.19 Upon review, the D.C. Circuit in Center for Biological Di-
versity v. Environmental Protection Agency vacated the Deferral Rule.20 In a 
narrow holding, the court found that each of the three administrative law doc-
trines that EPA attempted to use as justification for the Deferral Rule was in-
sufficient.21 
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit correctly limited its decision 
to a holding on the legal doctrines that EPA used to justify the Deferral Rule, in 
the rule’s actual record.22 The court’s careful review of the case law informing 
the one-step-at-a-time (“one-step”) doctrine—which EPA invoked as its prima-
ry justification—in particular, caught a disqualifying error in EPA’s attempted 
use.23 In so doing, the court recognized and refined a pragmatic regulatory tool 
that might have beneficial environmental impacts in the future.24 It also limited 
EPA’s ability to diverge from a statutory directive without justification.25 The 
court could have further refined the one-step doctrine, however, by requiring 
EPA to address the potential deviations from congressional intent that might 
result from an incremental approach.26 
                                                                                                                           
emissions. See Climate Change: Carbon Dioxide Emissions Associated with Bioenergy and Other 
Biogenic Sources, supra note 7. 
 16 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 406. 
 17 See Deferral for CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490, 43,493 (July 
20, 2011) [hereinafter Deferral Rule]; Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse 
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
52, 70, 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. Step 1 of the Tailoring Rule applies PSD and Title V pro-
grams to “anyway sources,” subject to programs because of conventional pollutant emissions; Step 2 
applies to sources with the potential to emit specified amount of GHGs. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
722 F.3d at 406. 
 18 Final Opening Brief of Petitioners at 1, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d 404 (No. 11-
1101). The D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for review of EPA’s final actions. 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
 19 Final Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 20 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 412. 
 21 Id. at 409–12. 
 22 See infra notes 116–132 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 103–113 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 133–141 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 133–141 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Deferral Rule was the most recent regulation of GHGs in “a cascad-
ing series of [GHG]-related rules and regulations,” which resulted from the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts27 that EPA was required to regulate 
GHGs under the CAA.28 The CAA requires EPA to regulate any air pollutant 
that it determines “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”29 In response to Massachusetts, EPA published an endangerment 
finding that defined CO2 as a GHG that causes air pollution.30 As such, EPA is 
now required to regulate all CO2 emitters under the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) and Title V permitting programs.31 
On May 7, 2010, the Tailpipe Rule acknowledged that stationary GHG 
emitters were required to submit to the PSD and Title V permitting programs.32 
On April 2, 2010, the Timing Rule concluded that major stationary GHG emit-
ters33 came under the purview of those programs as well.34 Finally, on June 3, 
2010, the Tailoring Rule recognized that immediate implementation of the pre-
vious two rules would overwhelm the abilities of permitting authorities, and 
thus staggered the applicability of the PSD and Title V programs over two 
years.35 When EPA issued the Tailoring Rule, it declined to take a final posi-
tion on whether to exempt b-CO2 emissions.36 As such, all qualifying CO2 
emitters, including b-CO2 emitters, were required to obtain PSD and Title V 
permits.37 
On July 15, 2010, EPA issued a Call for Information seeking technical 
and scientific information to evaluate options for treating b-CO2 sources dif-
                                                                                                                           
 27 549 U.S. at 529–30. 
 28 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 404 (citing Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516; 
Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by CAA Permit-
ting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Timing Rule]; Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Tailpipe Rule]. 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). Once EPA determines that a certain pollutant triggers the re-
quirement, the pollutant must be regulated under the PSD and Title V permitting programs. See Coal. for 
Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 144. 
 30 See Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,499. 
 31 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 404. 
 32 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 115; see Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,326. 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006). The CAA defines a major emitting facility as any stationary source 
that emits, or has the potential to emit, certain specified amounts of any air pollutant. Id. 
 34 Timing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,007. 
 35 See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516; see also Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 
at 113–14 (rejecting a challenge to the Tailoring Rule on standing grounds). 
 36 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,590–91 (despite acknowledging that “biomass or biogenic 
fuels and feedstocks could play [a role] in reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions”). 
 37 See id. at 31,591. 
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ferently at Step 238 of the Tailoring Rule.39 Then, on March 21, 2011, EPA is-
sued the Proposed Deferral Rule, seeking further comment on whether it 
should defer regulation of b-CO2 for a three-year period to gain a better under-
standing of its unique characteristics.40 Finally, on July 20, 2011, EPA issued 
the Deferral Rule, which postponed regulation of b-CO2 sources at Step 2 for 
three years.41 
In the Deferral Rule, EPA amended the regulatory definition of GHG to 
exclude b-CO2.42 It also inserted a sunset provision (SP), which limited the 
Deferral Rule to three years.43 According to the SP, in absence of a prior EPA 
rule permanently exempting b-CO2 sources from the PSD and Title V pro-
grams, all b-CO2 sources would again be required to conform at Step 2.44 De-
spite the SP, the Deferral Rule had potentially permanent effects.45 Exempted 
b-CO2 sources that were constructed during the deferral period would only 
have to obtain PSD and Title V permits if they undertook modification projects 
after the period ended in 2014.46 
On April 7, 2011, CBD filed a Petition for Review before the D.C. Cir-
cuit—which has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue47—challenging the De-
ferral Rule.48 In its final opening brief, filed on July 24, 2012, CBD argued that 
because EPA regulates CO2 as a GHG, the CAA requires it to regulate b-CO2 
under the PSD and Title V programs.49 It further contended that because there 
is no express permission in the CAA for EPA to diverge from that instruction, 
the Deferral Rule was invoked in excess of statutory authority.50 On July 23, 
2012, EPA filed a final reply brief that defended the legality of the Deferral 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. at 31,516. 
 39 See Call for Information, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,173, 41,174 (July 15, 2010); Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 31,516 (applying PSD and Title V permitting programs to sources with the potential to emit 
specified amounts of GHGs). 
 40 Proposed Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 15,251, 15,259 (mentioning that the amount of CO2 
released from biogenic sources is sequestered by new plants, which results in no addition of CO2, as 
opposed to CO2 released anthropogenically, which is reabsorbed over millennia and leads to a long 
carbon “debt” period). 
 41 Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,492; Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
 42 Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,493; see Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 407. The 
Endangerment Finding brings CO2 under the guise of the CAA-covered GHGs, without differentiating 
CO2 based on its source. 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,499. 
 43 Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,499; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 407. 
 44 See Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,499; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 407. 
 45 See Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,499; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 407. 
 46 See Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,499; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 407. 
 47 Charles Riordan, Comment, Barring the Gates: Timing and Tailoring Environmental Standing 
and Greenhouse Gas Regulation After CORRI v. EPA, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 567, 572 n.34 
(2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006) as a source of exclusive jurisdiction for regulations 
promulgated under the CAA). 
 48 Final Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 18, at 1. 
 49 Id. at 18; see Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,499. 
 50 Final Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 18, at 58. 
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Rule.51 EPA countered that it was justified in treating b-CO2 differently be-
cause of its unique, unforeseen characteristics.52 EPA also reiterated the three 
administrative law doctrines it invoked in the Deferral Rule: the de minimus 
doctrine,53 the one-step-at-a-time (“one-step”) doctrine, and the administrative 
necessity doctrine.54 It then invoked a fourth doctrine—the absurd results doc-
trine55—in its brief.56 EPA relied most heavily on the one-step doctrine, which 
grants administrative agencies the ability to incrementally implement a con-
gressional order.57 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the D.C. Circuit vacated the Deferral Rule.58 Before considering the merits, the 
court determined that because there was a “purely legal and sufficiently final” 
issue fit for judicial decision,59 and that withholding a decision would cause 
the parties to suffer hardship,60 the case was ripe for review.61 On the merits, 
the court rejected the new rationale that EPA discussed in its brief.62 Citing the 
Supreme Court decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,63 the D.C. Circuit held that 
the Deferral Rule must be adjudicated on the basis of the substantive legal doc-
trines articulated by EPA as justifications for the rule, in the rule’s official rec-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Final Brief of Respondents at 22–23, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d 404 (No. 11-1336). 
 52 See id. at 40. 
 53 Id. at 35. The de minimus doctrine enables agencies to grant regulatory exemptions when the 
regulation creates a significant burden on the regulated, or the agency itself, but has limited or 
miniscule benefit. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360–61 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In EPA’s 
brief, the agency conceded that the de minimus doctrine could be used only for permanent exemptions 
and was thus inapplicable to the temporary Deferral Rule. Final Brief of Respondents, supra note 51, at 
35. 
 54 Final Brief of Respondents, supra note 51, at 22–23. The administrative necessity doctrine 
permits an agency to diverge from a congressional order when the agency is able to show that attainment 
of the congressional objective would otherwise be impossible. See Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
719 F.2d 436, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 55 Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The absurd re-
sults doctrine enables agencies to construe a statute in way that would not produce an absurd result. Id. 
EPA argued that because b-CO2 emissions may not only pose no danger to public health and welfare, but 
potentially benefit the public as a carbon sink, it would be contrary to a goal of the CAA, namely com-
bating climate change, and thus absurd to adopt a rule that could counteract a net positive environmental 
effect. See Final Brief of Respondents, supra note 51, at 59. 
 56 Final Brief of Respondents, supra note 51, at 57–59. 
 57 See id. at 36–40. 
 58 722 F.3d at 412. 
 59 Id. at 408. 
 60 Id. (finding the general lack of knowledge of how many b-CO2 sources were constructed at the 
time of the decision, and an inability to predict how many more might be constructed by end of the defer-
ral period, as sufficient to conclude that the potential for excessive CO2 emissions presented a possible 
hardship). 
 61 Id. (citing In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2011) to explain the prudential 
ripeness doctrine). 
 62 Id. at 409. 
 63 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
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ord.64 The D.C. Circuit also rejected EPA’s invocation of the absurd results 
doctrine as post hoc.65 
The D.C. Circuit held that EPA failed to properly use each of the doc-
trines it invoked.66 It first agreed with EPA’s own admission that the de mini-
mus doctrine was inapplicable because it may only be used to justify perma-
nent exemptions.67 It next found that EPA’s use of the one-step doctrine was 
arbitrary and capricious, as EPA articulated neither the stated goal of the CAA 
in regulating CO2, nor how a temporary exemption of b-CO2 sources was a 
step toward that goal.68 Finally, the court held that EPA’s use of the administra-
tive necessity doctrine was arbitrary and capricious because EPA failed to 
adopt “the narrowest feasible exemption.”69 
Finding no legal justification, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Deferral 
Rule.70 The court, however, intentionally withheld a decision on the question 
of “whether the agency has authority under the [CAA] to permanently exempt 
[b-CO2] sources from the PSD permitting program.”71 That query remains pur-
posefully unanswered.72 Further, the court withheld a decision on whether EPA 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409. 
 65 See id. at 411–12 (citing Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 358 F.3d 936, 
949 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see also Mova Pharmaceuticals Corp., 140 F.3d at 1068 (finding that EPA may 
not invoke the absurd results doctrine when EPA does not square its use of the doctrine with congres-
sional intent). The decision in Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal imposes a fundamental obligation 
on EPA to set forth reasons for its actions. 358 F.3d at 949. The D.C. Circuit cited to Northeast Mary-
land Waste Disposal in the present case to demonstrate that EPA’s reliance on the absurd results doc-
trine justification that it used for the Tailoring Rule—which was legitimate, but in furtherance of a 
different objective than the Deferral Rule—to then justify the Deferral Rule, leads to a failure of EPA’s 
obligation to set forth reasons for its actions. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409; Ne. 
Md. Waste Disposal, 358 F.3d at 949. 
 66 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409–12. 
 67 See id. at 409 (due to the sunset provision, the Deferral Rule was not a permanent exemption). 
 68 Id. at 409–10. 
 69 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410–11; Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 463. Reliance on 
the administrative necessity doctrine requires an agency to adopt the narrowest feasible exemption, 
and the court found here that EPA had arbitrarily and capriciously rejected a proposed middle-ground 
option represented in the Deferral Rule. See Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,496 (proposing that 
EPA require b-CO2 sources to obtain PSD and Title V permits, but only if the emitter neglected to self-
regulate and thus failed to make an effort to account for the net carbon cycle impact that it was hav-
ing). EPA’s obligation, according to the court, was not necessarily to adopt the middle-ground option, 
but to at least provide an explanation for why it rejected an option that would have reduced emissions 
from b-CO2 sources, where the Deferral Rule would have permanently exempted them. See Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 411 (citing Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 464, which imposed a duty to 
explore such alternatives). 
 70 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 412. 
 71 Id. Instead of addressing that question, the court held merely that if, hypothetically, EPA were 
allowed to implement incrementally, it still would have failed. Id. 
 72 See id. (building on the same notion from note 71—that EPA failed to use the one-step doctrine 
properly—but making no decision on the sufficiency of the doctrine’s use if it were invoked compe-
tently). 
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would be justified in deferring regulation pursuant to any of the doctrines it 
invoked, had it invoked any of them properly.73 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The one-step-at-a-time (“one-step”) doctrine authorizes administrative 
agencies to incrementally promulgate regulations and rules based on congres-
sional orders.74 In 1984, in National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC—the 
first case to identify the doctrine—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that there is no precise circumstance under which an agency may de-
fer the implementation of a congressional order, but provided two requirements 
to guide subsequent adjudications of the one-step doctrine.75 
First, an agency must make “some estimation, based upon evolving eco-
nomic and technological conditions, as to the nature and magnitude of the 
problem it will have to confront when it comes to resolve the postponed is-
sue.”76 The estimation must be “plausible and flow from the factual record 
compiled,” and if so, a reviewing court will defer to the agency’s judgment.77 
Second, the court must consider whether it was reasonable in light of the con-
gressional goal for the agency to have deferred implementation of its regula-
tion.78 Within that consideration, the court instructed that a “background of 
rapid technical and social change,” and the practical reversibility of the agen-
cy’s decision—should it prove to be wrong—most easily justify a deferral.79 
Conversely, the court held that a deferral is least justifiable if there is an appar-
ent potential for error in the agency’s predictive judgment, for it to cause “cat-
astrophic effects on the public welfare,” or when it would likely render efforts 
to attain the congressional goal to be “systematically defective.”80 
In the D.C. Circuit’s 1989 decision in City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, the court 
further articulated the one-step doctrine established in National Association of 
Broadcasters in its consideration of a decision made by the Secretary of the 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that 
the circumstances under which an administrative agency may defer regulation are incapable of being 
captured in a single doctrine). 
 74 See City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcast-
ers v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 75 Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 1211. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id.; see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 658 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that EPA is forbidden from making “reckless decisions to mortgage the 
future for the present . . .”). 
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Interior regarding the Endangered Species Act (ESA).81 The court held that 
agencies “have great discretion to treat a problem partially,” and that as long as 
each incremental step is a step toward achieving a solution to the problem 
identified by Congress, it would not strike down the ruling.82 Further, the court 
held that whether or not an agency should have deferred action is not at issue.83 
Rather, the only necessary inquiry is whether the agency was cognizant of the 
desired outcome, and was, in its judgment, attempting to achieve that out-
come.84 Thus, the court held that an agency will be justified in addressing a 
problem incrementally as long as it complies with the National Association of 
Broadcasters test, articulates what it believes to be statutorily required, and 
then articulates how it intends to achieve that goal incrementally.85 Absent 
such articulations, the court held that there would be no basis for determining 
whether the agency’s action was a step in the congressionally ordered direc-
tion.86 
In the D.C. Circuit’s 1998 decision in Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition 
v. FAA, the court placed further emphasis on the articulation of the statutory 
goal requirement set forth in Lujan, while considering whether the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) was justified in using a three-step plan to re-
store the natural quiet in the Grand Canyon.87 The court emphasized that when 
an agency invokes the one-step doctrine, it must articulate the statutory goal it 
is tasked with achieving, and then demonstrate how an incremental approach 
would achieve that goal.88 If the agency sufficiently demonstrates that a defer-
ral is still in line with Congress’s stated goal, and further, has proven that the 
decision to take an incremental approach was reasonable, the court “will take 
the government at its word.”89 The court also articulated that it would be arbi-
trary and capricious to use the one-step doctrine to ignore a congressional goal 
without any explanation, or to reject a congressional goal without citing any 
authority to do so.90 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See 891 F.2d at 935 (finding that the listing of the Mojave Desert Tortoise, but not the Arizona 
Sonoran Tortoise, as an endangered species under the ESA to be an acceptable use of the one-step 
doctrine). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See 154 F.3d 455, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935. The petitioners sued because 
aircraft noise from sightseeing tours disrupted the natural quiet of the Grand Canyon. Grand Canyon 
Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 478. 
 88 See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 478; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935. 
 89 Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 478; see Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935 (holding that agen-
cies must demonstrate sufficient reasonableness in deciding to use an incremental approach). 
 90 See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477. 
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Most recently, the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, while not directly addressing the one-step doc-
trine, articulated a broad principle that has direct bearing on the doctrine’s 
use.91 The Court held that agencies have broad discretion to choose how to 
best distribute and use their limited resources and personnel to carry out their 
delegated responsibilities.92 It did not, however, make any suggestion that 
agencies could fundamentally diverge from congressional orders.93 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s Deferral Rule.94 
The court held that the Deferral Rule could not be justified by any of the ad-
ministrative law doctrines EPA invoked and focused its analysis most heavily 
on EPA’s arbitrary and capricious use of the one-step-at-a-time (“one-step”) 
doctrine.95 The court found first that EPA had failed to identify what it believed 
that compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA)-mandated regulation of biogen-
ic carbon dioxide (b-CO2) meant, and further, that EPA failed to proffer an in-
terpretation of the CAA that would have enabled it to treat a b-CO2 source dif-
ferently from any other carbon dioxide (CO2) source.96 It thus rejected EPA’s 
invocation of the one-step doctrine as insufficient, though it withheld a deci-
sion on whether EPA had the statutory authority to invoke the doctrine to di-
verge from the CAA.97 
The court held that EPA failed to comply with the most basic procedural 
requirements of the one-step doctrine.98 It found that EPA failed to offer any 
interpretation of the CAA that would allow the agency to defer regulation of b-
CO2 as a kind of greenhouse gas (GHG) different from anthropogenic CO2.99 
                                                                                                                           
 91 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. 
 94 722 F.3d 404, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490, 43,492 (July 20, 
2011). 
 95 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409–12 (citing Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. 
FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which set a standard for whether an agency’s use of the one-
step doctrine is arbitrary and capricious). 
 96 Id. at 409–10; see Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,497–99. 
 97 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409. 
 98 Id. at 410 (citing Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 
891 F.2d 927, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1210 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984)). As Lujan established, EPA was required at a minimum to articulate what it believed the CAA 
required regarding b-CO2 emissions regulations, and how it believed the Deferral Rule would operate in 
furtherance of that goal. 891 F.2d at 935; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210 (hold-
ing there is no precise test for invoking the one-step doctrine). 
 99 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410 (finding no explanation for why scientific uncer-
tainty grants statutory authority to diverge from an order to regulate all CO2). 
2014] Incremental Rulemaking and Regulation of b-CO2 551 
The court even offered a hypothetical to demonstrate the difference between 
what EPA did, and what was required.100 As such, the court held, “we simply 
have no idea what EPA believes constitutes ‘full compliance’ with the statute 
. . . the Deferral Rule is one step towards . . . what?”101 
The D.C. Circuit had only reviewed the one-step doctrine three times pri-
or to Center for Biological Diversity.102 Since first recognizing an agency’s 
ability to incrementally implement a congressional order despite the lack of 
necessity to do so,103 the D.C. Circuit has maintained that the one-step is a 
pragmatic doctrine.104 It was conceived of primarily to enable agencies to 
maintain flexibility in the face of economic and technological evolutions, 
which would have made literal implementation of a congressional order less 
robust, though not impossible.105 While the court has generally offered expan-
sive deference to agencies using the one-step doctrine,106 it drew a hard line in 
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition—prohibiting agencies from ignoring con-
gressional intent without explanation or justification.107 
In each prior case, the D.C. Circuit held that regardless of whether it 
agreed with the particular agency, the agency had properly articulated its statu-
tory orders, and sufficiently demonstrated why the approach was still a step 
toward achieving the goal.108 By contrast, the court in Center for Biological 
Diversity held that EPA not only made no mention of the congressional pur-
pose of the CAA, but also attempted to use an explanation of the scientific un-
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. (finding that if the Deferral Rule interpreted the CAA as requiring permits only for b-CO2 
sources with an adverse impact on the carbon cycle, EPA would have articulated a reason for why it 
did not have to regulate all b-CO2 sources, but that EPA did no such thing). 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; Nat’l Ass’n of 
Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 103 See Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 463 (finding that when an incremental approach is necessary, 
agencies can invoke the administrative necessity doctrine). Thus, if there is a necessity, agencies 
would not have to rely on the one-step doctrine to regulate incrementally. See id. 
 104 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210; 
see Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935. 
 105 See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210 (holding that the administrative necessity 
doctrine is applicable only where it would be impossible to achieve the congressional goal without 
incremental implementation). 
 106 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 
478; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 107 See 154 F.3d at 477. 
 108 See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477 (finding that the FAA recognized the con-
gressional goal and articulated a sufficient incremental plan to achieve it); Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935 
(finding that the Secretary of the Interior articulated a statutory order of Endangered Species Act and 
acted sufficiently in furtherance of that goal); Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211 (finding 
that the FCC properly articulated the congressional goal and acted reasonably in postponing regulation 
against an evolving technological background). 
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certainties of b-CO2 to disguise its inability to explain how the Deferral Rule 
could be a step toward its unstated goal.109 
The finding that EPA’s use of the one-step doctrine was arbitrary and ca-
pricious is a victory for the environment.110 By vacating the Deferral Rule, the 
D.C. Circuit achieved two critical results.111 First, by coalescing the various 
components of the one-step doctrine into a clear rule, and by naming it, the 
court acknowledged it as a valuable, practical, and pragmatic tool, which EPA 
can now use to protect the environment.112 Henceforth, EPA need not rely sole-
ly on administrative necessity to justify piecemeal implementation of congres-
sional orders.113 Second, the court defined what the one-step doctrine is not—
namely a lame-duck regulatory grant for agencies to defy congressional or-
ders.114 Had it gotten bogged down in the Deferral Rule’s detailed explanation 
of the uncertainty surrounding b-CO2, the court might have missed the funda-
mental flaw in EPA’s invocation of the one-step doctrine.115 It thus avoided 
granting EPA the power to defy Congress.116 
The D.C. Circuit’s articulation of the one-step doctrine is an important 
step toward clarifying a previously amorphous and uncertain regulatory tool.117 
The court could, however, have made the requirements more robust, in order to 
ensure the doctrine’s proper use.118 This Comment proposes that agencies 
should be required to comply with the following test:119 (1) state what the stat-
ute requires and what Congress intended by requiring it;120 (2) justify both the 
rationale and logic behind a decision to diverge from the requirement;121 (3) 
explain how each potential incremental step still works to achieve Congress’s 
intended result;122 and finally, this Comment suggests a new requirement—to 
(4) address all ways in which an incremental approach could undermine con-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410. 
 110 See id. at 409–10. 
 111 See id. at 409–12. 
 112 See id. at 410; Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; Nat’l 
Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 113 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 463–64. 
 114 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410. Had the court allowed EPA’s attempted use, 
agencies in the future could cite to the present case as an inferential grant of allowance to divert from 
congressional orders without articulating why. See id. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. at 410–12; Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; 
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 118 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410. 
 119 See id. The first three prongs of the test are based on articulated requirements of three previous 
cases, whereas the fourth prong is based on a coalescing effect of the present case. See id. 
 120 See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211 (this requirement already exists). 
 121 See Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935 (this requirement is a more demanding take on Lujan). 
 122 See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477. 
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gressional intent, and how to avoid such a result.123 The D.C. Circuit should 
consider adding the fourth prong in a future case, to ensure the exclusively 
progressive capacity of the one-step doctrine.124 
The one-step doctrine is a “pragmatic one.”125 It is sensible that agencies 
should be able to interpret congressional intent in light of the real-world situa-
tions and influences related to that intent.126 Further, agencies should not be 
limited to implementing statutory orders incrementally only where failing to 
do so would render the goal impossible.127 Thus, the one-step doctrine now 
enables agencies to achieve congressional goals in the most efficient and via-
ble ways possible.128 As the doctrine did for the FAA, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and the FCC in their respective mediums, the one-step doctrine should 
enable EPA to achieve robust environmental benefits.129 But as the court has 
now clearly stated, the one-step doctrine is a tool meant to further congression-
al intent—not circumvent it.130 To prevent the potential for abuse, the Court 
presciently placed bright-line restrictions on its application.131 Where before, 
agencies could rely on the lack of clarity regarding the one-step doctrine to 
sidestep a congressional order, now even the substantial grant of deference to 
agency judgment will not permit disguised rulemakings meant to circumvent 
statutory orders.132 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409–12; Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d 
at 477; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. The first three steps of 
the suggested test, taken from the case law, are reactionary articulations of the doctrine based on uses 
by the FAA, Secretary of the Interior, and FCC. Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; 
Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. The fourth step is a reaction to 
what EPA attempted to do in the present case and is based on the court’s response upon discovering 
EPA’s mistaken usage. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410, 412. 
 124 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410, 412. The court struck down EPA’s use of the 
one-step doctrine and articulated the doctrine more clearly with a goal of making it more useful to 
achieve congressional intent, without allowing it to be useful for ignoring congressional intent. Id. 
 125 Id. at 410; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 126 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 
1210. 
 127 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 
1210. But see Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 463–64 (holding that agencies are limited to implementing 
statutory orders incrementally only where a failure to do so would render the goal impossible). 
 128 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410. The court limited use of the one-step doc-
trine to circumstances where an agency is not expressly or implicitly prohibited from diverging from a 
statutory order, which will be judged on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 129 See id.; Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 477; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935; Nat’l Ass’n of 
Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1210. 
 130 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; see Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 
477. 
 131 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; see Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal., 154 F.3d at 
477. 
 132 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 410; Lujan, 891 F.2d at 935. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the one-step-at-a-
time doctrine as a legitimate environmental protection tool for EPA to use. By 
clarifying an agency’s ability to regulate incrementally, the court identified the 
circumstances under which the doctrine is appropriately invoked, but also clar-
ified that it is not a method for circumventing congressional intent. This hold-
ing provides important judicial guidance regarding the application of a poten-
tially useful environmental doctrine. The court’s decision is a victory for the 
environment. No longer will EPA, or any other agency, be able to obfuscate its 
primary reasons for incremental action in an attempt to avoid a congressional 
order that it does not agree with, does not wish to implement, or that it is being 
pressured to deflect. 
